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Leonard v.B. Sutton Award Paper
A Permanent International Criminal Court:
A Proposal that Overcomes Past Objections
Sandra L. Jamison*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it."
- Scripture on the Entrance Gate of
Dachau, World War II Nazi Concen-
tration Camp.
Fifty years after the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps,
egregious violations of international humanitarian law continue.
Bosnians, Rwandans, Haitians, and Guatemalans, for example, face
genocide, torture, rape, and unjust imprisonment at the hands of re-
pressive national regimes. Now is the time to stop these breaches of
international humanitarian law, and to prevent their recurrence in the
future, by creating a permanent international criminal court empow-
ered to try these violators and to enforce their sentences.
Over the past 500 years, the global community has sought numer-
ous ways to confront crimes against humanity. The proposals made
have contributed overwhelmingly to the present desire to establish a
fixed international criminal court, but concerns about extradition, the
virtual impossibility of codifying internationally recognized crimes, and
the Act of State doctrine continue to impede progress in the establish-
ment of such a court.
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In 1993, the United Nations established an ad hoc military tribu-
nal, the International Tribunal for Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, at the Hague, to try violators of
international human rights in the former-Yugoslavia (henceforth re-
ferred to as the Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal). To date, the court has not
tried any of the alleged offenders. In Argentina in the 1980's, ex-Presi-
dent Alfonsin and the Sabato Commission fought to bring justice to the
leaders of the Guerra Sucia through domestic proceedings, but, these
efforts proved futile when the following president, Menem, pardoned
the perpetrators.
These two phenomena lead to two conclusions: 1) the time, ex-
pense, and difficulty of establishing an ad hoc tribunal renders it an
ineffective mechanism of deterring crime; and 2) domestic proceedings
are an inadequate alternative to an international criminal court. Al-
though they did not present long-term solutions to international crime,
these two tribunals should be applauded for the pivotal role they
played in furthering the principles of international criminal account-
ability.
In recognition of this need for accountability, the International
Law Commission concluded its draft proposal for the creation of a
permanent international criminal court in July of 1993. This compre-
hensive proposal, with certain alterations, should serve as the center-
piece for the future of international criminal law.
The purpose of this commentary is to examine the historical ef-
forts to develop an international criminal court, including the reasons
for their various failures, and to incorporate this information into a
new proposal for a workable permanent criminal court. To accomplish
this goal, Section II analyzes these historical proposals, focusing on the
critical contributions each has made to the concept of establishing an
international criminal court. Section III analyzes the current Bosnian
ad hoc Military Tribunal, and the International Law Commission's
proposal for a permanent international criminal court. The final section
of the paper provides a new proposal for the establishment of a perma-
nent international criminal court that overcomes the objections set
forth against the establishment of such a court. The proposal includes
an outline of the institutional framework, jurisdiction, procedural laws,
and enforcement mechanisms essential to an effective permanent in-
ternational criminal court.
1. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Fifth




II. HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
A. 1474 to Pre-World War I
The global community has long been aware of its need for interna-
tional courts to resolve international disputes. In fact, the Internation-
al Court of Justice (ICJ) was initially created to resolve civil disputes,
but the world still lacks a permanent international criminal court to
address violations of international humanitarian law.
The idea of an international criminal court traces back to 1474,
when Peter Von Hagenbush was tried and convicted by Austrians for
crimes against "God and man," following his rule over the people of
Breisach.2 During the twentieth century, colonial powers declined
while international trade, security, and humanitarian relations flour-
ished. Countries have increasingly assented to bilateral treaties, multi-
lateral treaties, and international conventions in exchange for greater
benefits or security. The creation of an international penal code and
court began at the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, during which
the former produced the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes, and the latter produced a "Court of Arbitral Justice."3 Whereas
the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 stipulated that submission to
the court would be optional, by 1907 the leaders of the international
community recognized the importance of "obligatory" participation in
an international forum for dispute resolution. Thus, the Court of Arbi-
tral Justice made a proposal during the Second Hague Peace Conven-
tion of 1907, conveying this principle of obligatory arbitration.4 The
Convention's members agreed that the court would only go into effect
upon the occurrence of three events: 1) agreement and ratification of
the proposal during the Naval Conference of 1908, 2) the creation of a
constitution for the court, and 3) the members' selection of judges. Two
events stalled this momentum to develop an international criminal
court and left the international community bereft of its court. First,
the Naval Conference of 1908 never occurred, leaving ratification in-
complete.5 Second, the United States modified its original agreement
to the principal of obligatory participation when it perceived a conflict
between the jurisdictional power of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
potential jurisdictional power of the proposed international criminal
court. Justice Weeramantry, currently a member of the International
2. Joel Cavvichia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in the
1990s, 10 Dic. J. INT'L L. 223 (1992).
3. David J. Bederman, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in IN-
TERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9-11 (Mark W. Janis, ed.
1992).
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Court of Justice, states the problem of the Court of Arbitral Justice
well: "it was neither a court, nor was it permanent."6
B. Post-World War I
World War I kept the idea for an international criminal court in
the background until 1919 when, at the end of the war, U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson proposed both the creation of the League of Nations
and a Peace Plan. This Peace Plan contained twenty-six articles, in-
cluding Article 14 which proposed a Permanent Court of International
Justice limited to disputes "which the parties thereto submit to it."
7
In 1919, the League's Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors
of the Wars and on the Enforcement of Penalties was delegated the
task of investigating persons who had been involved in crimes against
humanity and the laws or customs of war. The Commission considered
crimes such as rape, use of poisonous gas, murders, massacres, and
conspiring to wage aggressive war to be crimes against humanity and
war, and therefore subject to investigation.8 The Commission proposed
a High Tribunal consisting of twenty-two members, chosen by the
victorious powers, who would enforce "the principles of the laws of
humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience. "' The Ameri-
cans recorded three major reservations to this proposal. First, the U.S.
argued that the Commission's recommendation that Heads of State be
placed on trial was an ex post facto law, which would violate the rel-
ished "principle of legality" (no punishment without law, no crime
without law) in the United States. Second, the United States com-
plained that the standard of "laws and principles of humanity", adopt-
ed by the Commission, was too vague to provide individuals adequate
notice of the crime."0 In addition, the U.S. suggested that the differing
linguistic and interpretational definitions of all of the court's governing
terms could weaken the court's enforcement powers. These objections
continue to surface today in debates over the establishment of a per-
manent international criminal court.
The U.S.'s concern, however, over ex post facto laws was out-
weighed by the desire to hold the Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany re-
sponsible for egregious violations of humanitarian law during the First
World War. Accordingly, the U.S. participated in establishing Article
227 of the 1920 Treaty of Versailles, which permitted the arraignment
6. Justice Weeramantry, 1994 Macbougal Law Lecture at the University of
Denver College of Law (Nov. 22, 1994).
7. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 27.
8. Jean Graven, La Premiere Tentative Consecutive a la Guerre Mondiale de
1914-18, in TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COuRT 96 (Julius Stone &
Robert K Woetzel eds., 1970).




of the Kaiser Wilhelm II, a Head of State, for his "supreme offense
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."" Unfortu-
nately, the Kaiser escaped his trial by abdicating to then-neutral Hol-
land.'2 His escape proved that, in the absence of adequate enforce-
ment mechanisms or extradition procedures, the international criminal
court could not function effectively. At this time, the members of the
Legal Committee of the League of Nations decided that, until a crimi-
nal code was adopted by member states, there could be no court to try
international criminals.
During 1920 and 1921, the Executive Council of the League of Na-
tions commissioned an Advisory Committee of Jurists to prepare a
draft statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
In 1922, many states signed and ratified the draft statute, with the
exception of the U.S., whose Congress failed to support the broad inter-
national measures inspired by its own president. The PCIJ became the
predecessor of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) following World
War II.1'
Similarly, at the 1928 Havana Conference of Central American
states, the participants drafted a Code of International Penal Law
which codified piracy and slave trade, among others, as violations of
international law. The one caveat of this Code, however, was that it
would apply only to a state whose national laws also condemned this
conduct."' This provision allowed nations to profit from the "good will"
associated with the Penal Law, but, in effect, did not enhance the
principle of universal criminal accountability.Many efforts continued in
the quest to create an international criminal court. During the 1930's,
the international community took a stance on the punishment of ter-
rorists, and set up a Convention on Terrorism to meet in Geneva on
April 30, 1935. The purpose of the meeting was to: 1) discuss a draft
international criminal code proposed by the noted Italian scholar on
humanitarian rights, Pella, 2) set forth grounds for extradition, and 3)
propose, once again, the establishment of an international criminal
court." Several nations opposed the jurisdiction of the international
criminal court proposed. Therefore, one year later in 1936, the proposal
was amended to bifurcate the issue of terrorism from the issue of the
international criminal court. This decision allowed the Convention on
11. Id. at 32.
12. Graven, supra note 8, at 45-46.
13. MARK W. JANIS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 18
(1992).
14. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 45-46. See also Conferencias Internacionales
Americanas, 1899-1936, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1938, Supp., 1938-42
(Washington, 1943).
15. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 49; League of Nations: Committee for the Interna-
tional Repression of Terrorism, Report to the Council on the First Session of the
Committee (April 30-May 8, 1935).
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Terrorism to move forward, but unfortunately left the reality of an
international criminal court behind."1
By May 1938, nineteen states had signed the Convention on Ter-
rorism, but India was the only nation to ratify the Convention. Al-
though thirteen nations had signed the Convention for the Creation of
an International Criminal Court, none of these nations ever ratified
the court. 7 The major stumbling block for these two conventions was
a controversy over whether extraditions would be 'discretionary' or
'compulsory.'18 It appears that the majority of these nations were not
yet willing to give up their national sovereignty to a body with com-
pulsory jurisdiction.
C. Post-World War II
After World War II, the concept of an international criminal court
resurfaced in light of Nazi and Japanese wartime atrocities. In 1942,
the Allies met in London's St. James Palace, to discuss the possibility
of prosecuting Nazis for war crimes. The following year, the victorious
powers, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, agreed
to initiate criminal proceedings against the Germans.19 In 1944, the
United Nations set up a War Crimes Commission to investigate the
allegations against the Nazis. This Commission recognized the likeli-
hood that justice would not be served in the national court of a nation
where state policy had actively participated in the atrocities commit-
ted,° and thus it created a Convention for the Establishment of an
International War Crimes Court.
The Allies established the International Military Tribunal to pros-
ecute and punish major war criminals of European Axis-power on
August 8, 1945, and a similar tribunal for the Japanese war crimes on
January 19, 1946. They stipulated that subject matter jurisdiction
would consist of the following: 1) Crimes against the Peace, defined as
the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or as-
surances or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for any of
the forgoing; 2) Crimes against Humanity, defined as crimes such as
murder or extermination 21; 3) War Crimes, as delineated in the War
16. Id. at 50-51.
17. Id. at 55-56.
18. Id.
19. Cavvichia, supra note 2, at 3.
20. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 64; United Nations War Crimes Commission, His-
torical Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, C.50(1) (Sept.
30, 1994).
21. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [hereinafter
Charter of the IMTFE], April 26, 1946, Art. 5, in INSTniUTE FOR WORLD ORDER,
CRISIS IN WORLD ORDER, WAR CRIMINALS, WAR VICTIMS 26-28 (1971). These provi-
sions echoed the Nuremberg Principles set out in 1946 for the Nuremberg Trials
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Conventions; and 4) Conspiracy to commit any of these crimes. All four
of these crimes were recognized by the world community as general
principles of international law.22
Article 1 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal pro-
posed a tribunal "for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the
major war criminals of the European Axis."23 There were to be four
justices total, one per country from the United States, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France. Any conviction required a
majority of the vote. In the event of a tie, Article 4 allowed the Presi-
dent, selected at the beginning of the trial by all members, to cast the
deciding vote. Article 6 granted the International Military Tribunal
jurisdiction over Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity. The four powers chose the U.S. Chief Prosecutor,
Prosecutor Jackson, and statutory provisions were made for a fair tri-
al.' This format turned out to be highly successful for the ad hoc tri-
bunal.
In Nuremberg, on October 18, 1945, United States Chief Prosecu-
tor Jackson indicted twenty-four Nazi criminals for Crimes against
Peace, Humanity, War Crimes, and Conspiracy to commit any of these
crimes. Nearly one year later, on October 1, 1946, the final judgment
of the court was read aloud in open court. Three defendants were fully
acquitted, several others received partial acquittals and prison sen-
tences, and ten criminals were executed by hanging.2"
During the time that the Nuremberg International Military Tribu-
nal was active, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur set up a similar mili-
tary tribunal. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMFTE) in Tokyo was established to prosecute Far Eastern criminals
on the same four charges of Crimes against Peace, Crimes against
Humanity, and War Crimes and Conspiracy, and under the same sub-
ject matter jurisdiction as Nuremburg.' The trial lasted for two and
one half years, resulting in the conviction of all twenty-eight defen-
dants. A few defendants received light sentences, seven men were
sentenced to death by hanging, but the majority of the defendants
received life imprisonment.2 7
Following the Tokyo Trials, many criticisms surfaced about the
manner in which they were conducted. The criticisms included charges
that: 1) the prosecution did not present its case fairly when it refused
held in London.
22. Cavvichia, supra note 2, at 3.
23. FERENCZ, supra note 4, at 70.
24. Id. at 70-71.
25. Id. at 74.
26. Charter of the IMTFE, supra note 21. The provisions of the Tokyo War
Crimes Tribunal echoed those set out in 1946 for the Nuremberg Trials.
27. Id.
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to examine certain pieces of defense information; 2) the verdicts were
not based on the evidence presented at trial; and 3) the guilt of the
defendants was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' However, no
member of the Trials nor the Nuremberg Tribunal did anything to
address these concerns. The victorious powers of World War II walked
away from the trials satisfied that justice had been done, while the
vanquished walked away feeling that injustice had been imposed.
What distinguishes the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials from the cur-
rent Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal is the fact that the earlier trials were
imposed by victorious nations on defeated nations. The ad hoc tribunal
for the Bosnian war crimes, conversely, charges both the victorious and
the defeated parties in Bosnia before an "impartial" tribunal. This
distinction may quell some fears that the Bosnian tribunal will be
unjust.
To prevent future similar concerns as those raised by the interna-
tional community about the Tokyo trials, the United Nations General
Assembly, in 1948, requested that its International Law Commission
(ILC) "study the desirability and possibility of establishing an interna-
tional judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or
other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organi-
zation by international conventions. ""9
In 1949, several Geneva Conventions extended the list of war
crimes to include torture, international infliction of suffering, serious
bodily injury, forcing prisoners to work for imprisoners, and the depri-
vation of a right to a free trial.30 In August of 1949, these Geneva
Conventions established new humanitarian standards for the treat-
ment of wartime prisoners and civilians, willful killing and torture,
heightened standards for 'military necessity' defenses, and the possibil-
ity of a foreign country exercising extradition over another nations'
military personnel. One year later, in 1950, the ILC concluded that the
recent Geneva Conventions be drafted into a "Code of Offenses," which
would supplement the Nuremberg Principles and create a larger codi-
fication of international criminal law. Mr. Jean Spiropoulos of Greece
was charged with this task.3' Mr. Spiropoulos submitted a report and
a preliminary draft Code of Offenses to the ILC which delineated
crimes such as the violations of Customs of War, Conspiracy, and
28. RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 204-
208 (1971). This information is based on a letter written by Ben Bruce Blakeney, on
behalf of the Defense Counsel at Tokyo, to General MacArthur on November 21,
1948.
29. G.A. Res. 260 B (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 177 (1948).
30. Rosemarie Buchanan, Battling the Crimes of War: M. Cherif Bassiouni is on
the Front Lines of International Human Rights Law, STUDENT LAW. 14 (American
Bar Association, May 1993).




Crimes against Humanity. 2 The ILC realized that, in addition to a
Code of Offenses, enforcement provisions must be included in the
realm of international criminal law, or the process would be doomed to
fail.' The efforts to create an international criminal court were too
important to allow weak enforcement provisions jeopardize its effec-
tiveness. Its members felt that the aggression of one man should no
longer be able to bring the world to its knees, as it had during the sec-
ond world war.
D. The Cold War Era
Following the Genocide Convention, reports and proposals for an
International Criminal Court continued to emerge. At this time, how-
ever, the Soviet Union began to articulate opposition to an internation-
al criminal court as an unnecessary infringement upon its state sover-
eignty. This view characterized the Soviet Union's position in the Secu-
rity Council over this issue throughout the Cold War, effectively para-
lyzing the Council from taking any action.
After 1950, the U.N. General Assembly appointed a Committee on
International Criminal Jurisdiction which made slow progress for the
following reasons. The Committee's first major controversy arose in the
context of defining "aggression" as a violation of international law. The
Committee appointed a fifteen-member Special Committee to define
"aggression" and to sort through the various state-adopted interpreta-
tions. Without consensus on "aggression" there could be no court, and
without a court, no jurisdiction.3 4 This disagreement over the defini-
tion of "aggression" continued to paralyze the international criminal
arena until 1974. In addition, the escalation of the Cold War and the
Suez Crisis diverted the U.N. attention away from an international
criminal court.35
During the mid to late 1960's, concern over international crime
continued to escalate, re-emerging in the context of apartheid and ra-
cial discrimination. The following international conventions demon-
strated the world's desire to try individuals who committed crimes
against humanity: 1) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (1970), 2) the Declaration of Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Nations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), 3)
the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid (1973), 4) the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons,
including Diplomatic Agents (1973), 5) the Terrorism Convention
32. Id. at 20-22.
33. Id. at 23.
34. Id. at 40-46.
35. See generally FERENCZ, supra note 31.
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(1979), and 6) the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages (1979).36 The world continued slowly, but steadily, toward a
society in which its members would be responsible for their criminal
actions.
III. THE CURRENT BOSNIAN AD Hoc TRIBUNAL AND FOUR PROPOSALS
FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
In the early 1990's, proposals for an international criminal court
escalated due to the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the demise
of bi-polar stability, the rise of nationalistic and aggressive tendencies
by many nations and the internationalization of trade and policy. As a
result, the following two significant events have occurred: 1) an ad hoc
military tribunal, created by the United Nations, currently functions at
the Hague to try the violators of human rights in the former-Yugosla-
via; and 2) four proposals for the creation of a permanent international
criminal court have emerged. These four proposals include: 1) the 1953
U.N. Committee proposal; 2) the 1992 Bryan MacPherson proposal
created through an independent organization from the U.N.; 3) the
1992 American Bar Association (A.B.A.) Task Force on an Internation-
al Criminal Court; and 4) the 1993 International Law Commission
(ILC) draft proposal. Both the Bosnian ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal
and the most recent permanent court proposal, the ILC draft statute,
will be addressed in detail below. The remaining proposals will be dis-
cussed throughout the remainder of this paper.
A. The Bosnian Ad Hoc Military Tribunal
The current upheaval and violence in the former-Yugoslavia
caused the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, to recommend
the establishment of an ad hoc International Court for War Crimes in
Bosnia, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, in 1993. This chapter
authorizes U.N. intervention to counter a threat to peace.37 The court
is located at the Hague.3" At present, most of the mechanisms of the
court have been put into effect.
The court began in 1992 when the noted international criminal
law scholar, M. Cherif Bassiouni, initiated investigations into war
atrocities committed in the former-Yugoslavia through a five-member
U.N. Commission.39 Based on the Commission's findings that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the establishment of a court, the U.N.
36. Id.
37. Clare Dyer, Judge of Our Inactions, THE GUARDLAN, Oct. 1, 1994 at 29.
38. International Community Prepares Implementation of Peace Plan, AGENCE Eu-
ROPE, Reuters, May 6, 1993, available in WL DIALOG, INT-NEWS-C.
39. Sharon Cohen, Team Compiles Bosnia Atrocities for War Crimes Trial, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INT'L File.
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Security Council established the tribunal in May, 1993.' On April 16,
1994, the U.N. General Assembly voted to provide eleven million dol-
lars to the military tribunal to charge and prosecute those responsible
for crimes in Bosnia.4'
The full panel of eleven judges was elected by the U.N. General
Assembly on August 11, 1994. Six judges are to serve in two separate
trial courts on panels of three, and the remaining five judges are to
serve as an appeals court.42 According to its Chief Prosecutor, Judge
Richard Goldstone of South Africa, the first trials are scheduled to
take place in early in 1995.
Once elected, the judges adopted ninety-one rules governing the
detention of persons awaiting trial or appeal before the Tribunal,
guidelines for the assignment of counsel, and a unique array of indi-
vidual protections of witnesses and victims.' Upon completion of the
trials, it has already been determined that the Tribunal will be prohib-
ited from issuing a death penalty sentence, and prison sentences will
be carried out in any of the countries which have offered use of prison
space." The Rules of Detention contain a series of basic principles,
ranging from the management of the detention unit, the rights of
detainees, and the removal and transportation of detainees.' Twenty-
four Dutch prisons have been set aside for use of the tribunal to hold
those under indictment.' The use of Dutch prisons for those under
indictment will ensure that tribunal staff can oversee the treatment of
prisoners to make certain that international standards of fair treat-
ment of prisoners are upheld.
The Tribunal has also adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence
which relate to procedures for granting legal assistance, criteria for
fees and expenses, facilities and guidelines for assigned counsel, and
disciplinary measures for assigned counsel.47 In particular, the Tribu-
nal amended Rule 96 to include individual protection for victims of
sexual assault or rape."
The court is based on the premise that defendants must be pres-
40. Id.
41. Jean Michel Stoullig, Commission of Experts Presents Yugoslav War Crime
Report, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 16, 1994 (Geneva), available in LEXIS, NEXIS
Library, INTL File.
42. David Lefensky, 3 Strikes and You're In - In an International Criminal
Court, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 1994 at 2.
43. International Tribunal for Prosecution of War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia,
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, May 13, 1994.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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ent for trial. Although technically defendants will not be tried in ab-
sentia, if an accused fails to appear for trial, three judges will hear the
evidence, and may elect to issue a warrant to Interpol to find the de-
fendant.49 Any convictions resulting from the tribunal are to be car-
ried out in a state of the tribunal's choice.5" As Chief Prosecutor
Goldstone points out, the tribunal has an unfortunate Achilles heel.
While the tribunal is proceeding on the assumption that all countries
will comply with their international obligations, it has no ability to
force states to surrender their accused war criminals for trial." In
fact, Serbia presently refuses to recognize any legitimacy of the
court.52 In light of this incapacity, a strong likelihood exists that
some, perhaps many, defendants will flee to other states. The Tribunal
realizes that this fact leaves a complicated task for Interpol, and per-
haps will cause the court to function in name only.
Hopefully, now that most of the administrative and procedural
concerns of the court have been addressed, more time can be spent
seeking perpetrators in Bosnia. So far, only one defendant has been
named, located, and charged. A former Bosnian Serb prison guard,
Dusan Tadic, was arrested in Germany in'February, 1994,' and offi-
cially charged at the Hague on November 8, 1994.
B. The International Law Commission Draft
While the Bosnian ad hoc Court is an important interim step in
the development of international criminal law, the U.N. has deter-
mined that the world ultimately still needs a permanent international
criminal court. This decision followed the release of a report by the
ILC in 1990, arguing that human rights violations were on-going
mechanisms of state policy throughout the world. The report examined
the options pertaining to the development of an international criminal
court, and concluded that a permanent international criminal court
must be created as part of the United Nations. 55 In 1991, at its forty-
third session, the ILC adopted the draft articles of the Code of Crimes
49. Id.
50. War-Crimes Investigator Set To Present Findings, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 10, 1994 (The Hague), available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INT'L File.
51. Dave Todd, War Crimes Trials Set to Begin Soon: U.N. Tribunal About To
Hand Down Indictments For 'Crimes Against Humanity' In Former Yugoslavia, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 21, 1994, at A17, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INTL
File.
52. Mark Fuller, Yugoslavia: Croatia, Bosnia Set to Surrender War Crimes Sus-
pects, INTER PRESS, Oct. 11, 1994.
53. Urgent, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 14, 1994. (The Hague), available in
LEXIS, NEXIS Library, INT'L File.
54. Id.
55. Draft Code Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the Work-
ing Group Established Pursuant To The Request From the General Assembly to The
International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.454 (1990).
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against the Peace and Security of Mankind and transmitted these arti-
cles, through the Secretary General, to the governments of the U.N.
member states for comments, feedback and observations.56 In 1992, the
ILC set up a Working Group to consider further the issue of interna-
tional criminal jurisdiction57 and to incorporate the feedback from
member states on the establishment of an international criminal court.
These steps led the Security Council to adopt Resolution 780 on Octo-
ber 6, 1992, requesting the Secretary General to establish an impartial
Commission of Experts to examine and analyze the information sub-
mitted, and to conduct such further investigations as necessary to
report to the Secretary General its conclusions on the evidence of grave
breaches of international humanitarian law committed in the territory
of the former-Yugoslavia. 8
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE COURT
The key concerns raised by several nations who are reluctant to
establish a permanent international criminal court include the follow-
ing issues: 1) sovereignty; 2) jurisdiction (subject matter and personal);
3) the availability of ad hoc courts in its place; 4) cost and bureaucracy
of the court; 5) enforcement; 6) court mechanisms and 7) procedural
mechanisms of the court. Each is discussed separately below.
A. Sovereignty
Because sovereignty has long been viewed as the most fundamen-
tal right of a nation, many nations continue to believe that any in-
fringement upon sovereignty is a threat to their livelihood. However,
the internationalization of events and economics over time has created
a world in which the sovereign rights of one nation do infringe upon
the rights of another. For example, Bosnia's internal civil war has
caused a mass exodus of Bosnians emigrating to other European na-
tions, requiring medical attention, shelter, food, and other resources.
59
Bosnia's alleged "sovereign" rights over internal matters are impacting
the domestic capabilities of other European nations.'
One way suggested to mitigate the sovereignty concern is by cre-
ating a court with "concurrent jurisdiction" between national courts
and the international court. This allows the state to bring the defen-
dant to trial, with the option of obtaining a domestic or an internation-
56. Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at para. 173-174, U.N. Doc. A/46110 (1993).
57. Official Records of the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No.
10, at para. 98, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1993).
58. 75 U.N.T.S. 970-973; U.N. Doc. S/Res/780 (Oct. 6, 1992).
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al proceeding. Although providing the state more sovereignty on this
issue, there may be some other problems with "concurrent jurisdic-
tion." In particular, "concurrent jurisdiction" may undermine the legiti-
macy of the international court, and/or it may restrict the procedural
rights of individuals brought before another country's domestic court.
The absolute doctrine that a state is supreme in its own authority,
and need not take into account the affairs of other nations, is no longer
tenable.6 In contrast, an international criminal court will help na-
tions to protect their sovereign rights over domestic issues of crime
committed by foreign individuals, because it empowers them to act on
violations of criminal law that were previously out of their control.
Therefore, it is more likely that "by limiting its sovereignty, a state
proves that it is sovereign."62
B. Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues raise the questions of: Which laws will be
recognized in the international criminal court? (subject matter jurisdic-
tion) and To whom the laws will apply? (personal jurisdiction). In order
for an international criminal court to assert subject matter jurisdiction
over an individual or state, one of the following must exist: 1) an inter-
national criminal code must exist enumerating crimes to which the
country in question is not a 'persistent objector'; 2) a codification of
international conventions relating to criminal law; or 3) some type of
agreement or assent by the country to be bound to this law. In order
for an international court to have personal jurisdiction over an individ-
ual, states must sacrifice some portion of their state sovereignty guar-
anteeing them rights to adjudicate acts which are: 1) committed by
their citizens (nationality); 2) done to one of their citizens (protective
interest); 3) committed on their territory (territoriality); 4) committed
against their government (protective interest); or 5) deemed to be of
universal interest to the world community (universal interest). The
proposals for an international criminal court concern some nations
because they seek to go beyond these internationally accepted bases of
jurisdiction.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Any established court or criminal code must address: 1) which
crimes will be subject to its jurisdiction; and 2) whether the court will
have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts over
these crimes. Each is discussed below.
61. John W. Bridge, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice, in
INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 225 (Mark W. Janis ed.,
1992).
62. M. CHERIF BAssIoUNi & VED P. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL




Currently, customary international law and conventions define
the parameters of international criminal law. Although customary law
is not codified, it forms international law because its crimes maintain
a high level of universal condemnation. To date, twenty-two crimes
have been codified in the international community through both cus-
tom and convention: 1) Aggression, 2) War Crimes, 3) Unlawful Use of
Weapons, 4) Crimes Against Humanity, 5) Genocide, 6) Racial Discrim-
ination and Apartheid, 7) Slavery, 8) Torture, 9) Unlawful Human
Experimentation, 10) Piracy, 11) Aircraft Hijacking, 12) Threat and
Use of Force Against Internationally Protected Persons, 13) Taking of
Civilian Hostages, 14) Drug Offenses, 15) International Traffic in Ob-
scene Publications, 16) Destruction and/or Theft of National Treasures,
17) Environmental Protection, 18) Theft of Nuclear Materials, 19)
Unlawful Use of Mails, 20) Interference with Submarine Cables, 21)
Falsification and Counterfeiting, and 22) Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials.'
Because outrage in the world community has been so high against
these throughout this century, these crimes have been identified and
outlawed in the following: 1) Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; 2) the Kellogg-Briand
Peace Pace of 1928, which attempted to outlaw war as a means of
state policy; 3) the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which punished viola-
tors of the international laws of war; and 4) League of Nations and the
United Nations in their perseverance against acts of aggression by
nations.
Through various Geneva Conventions, the world community has
sought to regulate military conduct in armed conflicts by establishing
the concept of 'just' and 'unjust' wars." In particular, the War Con-
vention codified articles to prevent rape, undue forced labor, prisoner
of war mistreatment, and to set standards for noncombatant immuni-
ty, war against civilians, and guerilla warfare.6" For any charges lev-
ied under these articles, the proportionality of the measure and the
military necessity of the act both play critical roles in determining the
level of culpability.6
The drafters of the War Convention granted Universal Jurisdic-
tion over war crimes in Articles 49, 50, 129, and 146 of the Convention.
However, to this day, the only two bases of jurisdiction used in allega-
63. M. CHERIF BAssIOuNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, VOL I: CRIMES 135
(1986).
64. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, VOL. III: ENFORCEMENT
205 (1987); see also MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
65. See generally WALZER, supra note 64.
66. Id.
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tions of these crimes have been territoriality and nationality."7 Per-
haps these nations are reluctant to invoke Universal Jurisdiction out
of fear that another nation may use it later "in kind" to obtain jurisdic-
tion. While there is a need to regulate many other international
crimes, such as environmental terrorism or carelessness, and interna-
tional drug trafficking, these crimes have not achieved nearly the level
of international condemnation as Crimes Against Peace and Crimes
Against Humanity. The United Nations recently set up a Commission
on Narcotic Drugs, and an International Narcotics Control Board, to
set the framework for future codified international drug trafficking
laws. These ongoing attempts at crime codification will prove fruitful
when the international criminal court is well underway, and considers
expanding its jurisdiction.
The 1992 MacPherson proposal sets out the creation of a complete
international code of crimes as a long-term goal.' In the interim,
MacPherson confers subject matter jurisdiction only over War Crimes
and Crimes against Peace. 9 MacPherson suggests that jurisdiction
over any other crimes be conferred through separate conventions, pro-
tocols or agreements as nations are willing to do. He thus suggests
building international criminal law on a step-by-step basis, which
could eventually lead to full consent by nations over all crimes. This
proposal may be preferable to the ILC draft statute which calls for the
immediate codification of a long list of international crimes because
states may not be willing to buy-in to such a large infringement on
sovereignty.
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force, conversely, would expand jurisdiction
to include crimes such as drug trafficking, genocide, and torture, argu-
ing the need for regulation of these activities.7" Although this plan is
applauded for its brazen initiative, it is unlikely that many nations are
currently willing to place limitations on their own drug trafficking
practices.
The 1993 ILC proposal has not yet resolved its position on juris-
diction. It limits subject matter jurisdiction of the following Conven-
tions: the Genocide Convention; the Geneva Conventions; the Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft Convention; the Apartheid Convention; the Con-
vention Against the Taking of Hostages; and the Safety of Maritime
67. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 230.
68. BRYAN F. MACPHERSON, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: APPLYING
WORLD LAW TO INDIVIDUALS, Monograph #10, THE CENTER FOR U.N. REFORM EDU-
CATION, Washington, D.C., at 32 (1992).
69. Id.
70. American Bar Association Task Force on an International Criminal Court,
New York State Bar Association Joint Report with Recommendations to the House of
Delegates: Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 27 THE INT'L LAw. 270
(AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Spring 1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. Task Force].
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Navigation;7 and provides three ways that nations can accept such
jurisdiction: 1) comprehensive opt-in, 2) selective opt-in, and 3) selective
opt-out. Alterative A provides a comprehensive opt-in declaration to the
court, stating that the state accepts the court's jurisdiction over all of
its crimes.72 Alternative B provides each member state a selective opt-
in clause for every individual crime to which the state wishes to confer
jurisdiction. Alternative C provides a selective opt-out provision for any
crime to which a state does not wish to be party. Unfortunately, the
commentary to the article shows the ILC leaning toward the second
option, which allows states to opt-in only to those crimes they desire.
This opt-in method would result in considerable confusion, leaving
most nations wondering which crimes particular states were not sup-
posed to violate, and causing the regulation of international crime to
be little better off than it is under the current system. Additionally,
the ILC Draft does not propose that any of the Conventions actually be
codified into law, but rather that the states, on their own initiative, be
allowed to choose their own obligations under the multilateral conven-
tions. This approach may not send a strong enough message to inter-
national criminals to serve as an effective deterrent. What thief would
opt-in to a law prohibiting theft?
Perhaps better in the global view would be a system under which
only a few crimes were defined, such as genocide, apartheid, and hos-
tage-taking, but were strictly enforced against ALL member states.
Later, when the court gains the respect of its members, these members
could agree to expand the court's jurisdiction to a larger number of
crimes. This concept may be preferable to a court which is unable to
obtain jurisdiction over a consistent body of international crime.
b. Exclusive or Concurrent Jurisdiction
The extent to which exclusive jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction,
or transfer proceedings should apply to these international crimes is
also of paramount importance to this discussion.
Under exclusive jurisdiction, states give up all jurisdictional
rights over international crimes within the jurisdiction of the interna-
tional criminal court. 3 Although exclusive jurisdiction would probably
ensure the most coherent and consistent body of international criminal
law, few states would sacrifice such a large portion of their sovereignty
before the court gains any legitimacy.74 It is possible that an interna-
tional criminal court could have exclusive jurisdiction over some inter-
national crimes, but would reserve concurrent jurisdiction for others.75
71. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 271-276.
72. Id. at 274-275 (art. 23).
73. A.B.A_ Task Force, supra note 70, at 266-267.
74. Id.
75. M. Cherif Bassiouni and Christopher L. Blakesly, The Need for an Interna-
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Concurrent jurisdiction, conversely, would allow a state to decide,
on a case-by-case basis, if it would like to submit a criminal case to the
international criminal court, or if it would prefer to make a domestic
adjudication on the matter. A transfer of proceedings approach would
allow the international criminal court to apply the laws of the state
which also has jurisdiction in the international court, and merely
transfer the location of the case to the international criminal court.
This approach may be beneficial to maintain those national procedural
laws in the international court, in the event that the international
laws provide fewer procedural guarantees than the national laws.
However, in some countries, such as the United States, this latter
approach may violate the national constitution, which guarantees its
citizens a judicial body established by the U.S. Congress."
M. Cherif Bassiouni supports concurrent jurisdiction because it
fulfills the states' sovereignty concerns and allows the member states
either to transfer proceedings if they choose, or to retain them in the
national court under its own jurisdiction." To facilitate this process,
Bassiouni proposes a mechanism, called a de facto default, which
would transfer proceedings to the international court if the state has
failed to exercise its own jurisdictional opportunity.7" Further, if the
state chooses to adjudicate the claim itself, and fails to prosecute ade-
quately, then another state should be able to bring the action before
the international criminal court as a challenge to the state's action.
Both the 1953 U.N. Draft, in Article 26," and the 1992 A.B.A. Task
Force"° preferred the option of "concurrent jurisdiction" between the
national courts and the international court.
MacPherson's 1992 Draft, in Article 6, proposes that exclusive
jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction be blended so that the interna-
tional criminal court would have exclusive jurisdiction over major war
crimes, and concurrent jurisdiction with the national courts on other
international law issues.8 The exclusive jurisdiction over war crimes
and heinous crimes, such as genocide, would alleviate the "Argentine-
an problem," where military members brought to trial were later par-
doned by a new Administration.
tional Criminal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 115, 170-172 (1992).
76. A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 70, at 266-67.
77. Bassiouni and Blakesly, supra note 75, at 171-174.
78. Id.
79. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 251.
80. A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 70, at 268.




Personal jurisdiction determines who will be subject to the juris-
diction of the court. The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force and the 1953 U.N.
Commission proposal both agree on personal jurisdiction. This proposal
stated that both the state where the crime was committed and the
state of nationality of the accused must consent to jurisdiction of the
international criminal court in order for the court to obtain personal
jurisdiction over the individuals. s2 These proposals are not very far
reaching, however, because any nation unwilling to extradite an indi-
vidual under the current international legal framework would likewise
refuse to turn this individual over to the international court's jurisdic-
tion. Even the 1992 A.B.A. Task Force recognized the likelihood that
the U.S. would not grant jurisdiction to an international court if the
crime was against the United States, and the offender could be located
on its territory.8 Establishing a tough bottom line on personal juris-
diction is necessary to prevent the international criminal court from
following the ICJ's poor record of obtaining jurisdiction.
In 1992, the MacPherson proposal noted that personal jurisdiction
must be competent over any natural person, whether the head of gov-
ernment, a public official, or a private individual, and that this juris-
diction may be conferred on the court by convention, agreement, or
unilateral declaration.' In addition, this personal jurisdiction must be
conferred either by the state wherein that accused is located, a state
which is authorized to obtain custody, or any state which would have
jurisdiction based on domestic or international law. 5 This proposal is
more progressive in that it only requires one of the above mentioned
parties to consent to jurisdiction, not both.
C. Problems With An Ad Hoc Court
Many of those resistant to a permanent international criminal
court recognize the need to regulate international crime, but they ar-
gue that ad hoc courts can be established as they are needed, eliminat-
ing the bureaucracy of a permanent international criminal court.
Supporters of a permanent court counter that, first, an ad hoc
court, such as the Bosnian ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal, may violate
the principle of legality: "Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, Nulla Poena Sine
Lege" (no crime without law, no punishment without law)." It is diffi-
cult for an ad hoc court to place individuals on notice of its laws if it is
not in existence. Also, these scholars argue that it would be a gross
82. A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 70, at 268.
83. Id. at 269.
84. MACPHERSON, supra note 68, at 52-3 (arts. 5, 6).
85. Id.
86. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 226.
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injustice to the international community not to hold an international
criminal liable for egregious violations of international law.8" In U.S.
v. Von List, a case heard during the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, the court held that:
"it is not essential that a crime be specifically defined and charged
in accordance with a particular ordinance, statute, or treaty if it is
made a crime by international convention, recognized customs, and
usages of war, or the general principles of criminal justice common
to civilized nations generally.""
Thus, if it would be reasonable to assume that the individual
would know that a particularly "heinous" crime would be punishable
by law, then some individuals argue that the principle of legality is not
violated with an ad hoc court.89 These justifications have been used to
justify prosecution in all of the ad hoc courts to date. However, an
international criminal code and court is a highly effective way of pro-
viding notice to the international community of its subject matter ju-
risdiction (crimes), and to deter crime effectively at the outset.
Secondly, supporters of a permanent criminal court argue that ad
hoc courts do not deter crime as effectively as a permanent court. An
international criminal will not be afraid of a punishment institution
that does not exist. There is a strong argument that Nuremberg and
Tokyo, although highly effectively at an ex post facto punishment of
war criminals, has failed to deter ex ante other international criminals
from committing the same crimes. Proponents point out that one need
only examine the existence of state repression and genocide in the last
fifty years to sustain this argument.
Thirdly, ad hoc courts require more time and expense to create
than it would take to maintain a permanent court. The current ad hoc
military tribunal at the Hague demonstrates that it takes years to
establish a court, select judges, secure funding, and initiate proceed-
ings. Throughout history, these factors have kept all but three such
courts from being created. The Nazi and Japanese atrocities had en-
dured for years prior to the Allied victory and subsequent proceedings,
and the Bosnians faced years of torture before the initiation of proceed-
ings. In contrast to these three trials, the Kurds, subject perhaps to
the longest repression in this century, have never warranted enough
attention from the world community to establish an ad hoc court. Simi-
larly, the Rwandans, Haitians, and Guatemalans will continue to suf-
87. ROBERT K. WOETZEL, Nullum Crinen Sine Lege, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, in
TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 228-9 (Robert K Woetzel &
Julius Stone eds., 1970).
88. Id. at 229.
89. Id. at 228.
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fer from unredressed violations of human rights if the world continues
to rely on ad hoc courts. A permanent institution must be available on
an on-going basis to try perpetrators of human rights violations in all
nations of the world.
D. Bureaucracy and Cost
In addition to the issues of sovereignty, jurisdiction and ad hoc
courts, scholars have argued that the establishment of an international
criminal court would unduly increase the number of international
organs, and augment accompanying expense and obligation. Instead,
these states prefer to limit the number and scope of international insti-
tutions." This solution, however, does not address the continuing
threat of international criminals. In order to regulate international
crime, full participation by all countries in the world is needed. Any
reluctance on the part of nations to participate will damage the legiti-
macy of this court, and likely, the existence of other international
organs. Besides, there would be little benefit from a court if most
states refuse to participate in it.
Secondly, some fear that the court may become paralyzed by an
overloaded court docket if all individuals are given the opportunity to
bring their own cases to the court. A carefully drafted court, however,
can include a Committing Chamber to screen applicants and cases
prior to obtaining personal jurisdiction and proceedings.
Thirdly, some states, who support efforts to regulate international
crime, believe that the International Court of Justice should house
these international criminal proceedings, instead of creating a new
court.91 (This solution would obviously require the ICJ to expand its
jurisdiction.) Since the International Court of Justice has limited
means of enforcement available to it at present, however, this alterna-
tive may not be effective. Further, an amendment to the U.N. Charter
to expand the ICJ's jurisdiction is no less complicated a procedure than
a separate ratification process for the new international criminal court
through the U.N. General Assembly. Fourth, a court specifically geared
towards the resolution of international crime should be staffed with
specialists in international criminal law, and not with the general
jurisdiction judges of the ICJ.
E. Enforcement
Adequate enforcement of international criminal law is essential to
the success of an ICC and its anticipated deterrent effect on interna-
tional crime. As Robert A. Friedlander states: "the history of public
90. Robert A. Bloom, Main Draft Statutes, in TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 161 (Julius Stone & Robert K. Woetzel eds., 1970).
91. Id.
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international law over the past three and a quarter centuries has dem-
onstrated clearly and convincingly that direct enforcement in a com-
munity of mutually competing and unequal sovereignties has rarely oc-
curred."92 Friedlander also asserts that any criminal or penal statute
without ample enforcement provisions is at best an 'indirect enforce-
ment model,'93 which will not adequately deter crime.
Many critics of the international criminal court argue that it
would not be able to enforce its judgments, citing the International
Court of Justice as an example. This argument only strengthens the
case for an international criminal court separate from the ICJ. A new-
ly created international criminal court can learn from the lesson of the
ICJ in drafting its enforcement mechanisms. Similar to the current ad
hoc Bosnian court, the international criminal court can use Interpol as
a means of enforcing extradition to the court, and additionally, the
international criminal court can sanction or suspend the U.N. voting
rights of nations who harbor international fugitives. In order to break
the stigmatization of international institutions as ineffective, an inter-
national criminal court with effective enforcement mechanisms must
be created.
In discussing enforcement, scholars have tended to divide interna-
tional crimes into two groups: 1) crimes perpetrated by states (state-
led) and 2) crimes perpetrated by individuals (individual non-state
actors). Whereas the sanctions in Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, such
as interruption of economic relations, severance of diplomatic relations,
blockades, and if necessary, the use of force, are typically levied for
state-led crimes94, they often punish the population as a whole. Tradi-
tional penal sanctions, such as an international prison, international
community service, or some form of international parole, on the other
hand, may actually be more preferable because they are levied against
the state actors responsible for the violations. Other, non-retributive
forms of penal sanctions have been proposed, which would encourage
the preventive and rehabilitative themes of justice. These penal sanc-
tions include options such as fines, political and moral obligations, eco-
nomic compensation, military or community service and public an-
nouncement of a proven crime character.95 This may be a more func-
tional way to punish criminals for crimes against the international
community, because their punishment adds something back to the in-
ternational community.
The 1992 MacPherson proposal argues that a wide list of punish-
ments for individuals should be drafted into the court, such as fines,
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime, compensation to injured parties,
92. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 13.
93. Id. at 14.




work release, and probation." Although capital punishment would be
effective for crimes such as genocide, due to its controversy, it should
probably not be included for most crimes. 7
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force also proposes that the penalties be
severe, but that the death penalty should definitely not be used. 8 The
Task Force offers provisions for a pre-trial detention in the state where
the criminal was apprehended, but it recommends that the sentence be
served out in the country where the crime was committed,99 perhaps
so that the this nation feels that justice has been served. The problem
with this may be the administrative capacity of the tribunal to ensure
that the accused or convicted are being treated in accordance with
international fair standards of treatment. This monitoring is likely to
become complicated when the rights granted are in the hands of a
country who sees a non-national committing a crime on their territory.
This problem brings to mind the 1994 caning of an American citizen in
Singapore, for committing vandalism. This penalty received an on-
slaught of criticism from the Americans, which threatened the U.S.'
otherwise peaceful relations with Singapore.
The 1992 A.B.A. Task Force stated that "it would seem neither feasible
nor desirable to set up a 'Devil's Island' type of permanent detention
center" for this court,"° especially given the small number of cases
likely to come before the court in its first years. The MacPherson pro-
posal agreed, stating that such a facility would be expensive to main-
tain and unnecessary so long as state facilities could be used in its
place. In the future, an international penal facility may become neces-
sary and should then be created.
The 1993 ILC Draft proposes that: 1) imprisonment, up to, and
including life terms, 2) monetary fines,'"' and 3) loss of property (the
perpetrator may be required to return property or proceeds wrongly
received in the course of the crime) should be the primary forms of
punishment. ' 2 It states that the death penalty should never be used.
In determining prison terms, the laws governing the state of the
defendant, the state where the crime was committed, and the state
which has custody of and jurisdiction over the defendant0 3 should all
be taken into consideration. To enforce the sentences, the ILC proposed
Article 66, making the court responsible for supervising the prison sen-
tences to ensure compliance with the Standard Minimum Rules for the
96. MACPHERSON, supra note 68, at 45.
97. Id. at 45-46.
98. A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 70, at 276.
99. Id. at 277.
100. Id.
101. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 317 (art. 53).
102. Id. at 318.
103. Id. at 317-8 (art. 53).
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Treatment of Prisoners."" This would be true whether the sentence
is served in the state where the crime was committed or in a voluntary
state. The main concern with this proposal is that it would be difficult
to implement, unless a full time employee of the court is assigned to
each prison where a term is being served. The Draft also sets up a pro-
cedure for appeal to the seven judges of the court who did not take
place in the original judgment.0 5
F. Court Mechanisms
In creating an international criminal court, three important issues
to resolve are: (1) where to locate the court; (2) how to select its judges;
and (3) whether the court will be "adversarial", following the U.S. mod-
el, or "inquisitorial", following the European model.
1. The Court's Location
The court's sponsor and the responsibility for funding go hand-in-
hand. If the international criminal court is established as a U.N. or-
gan, the U.N. member states will be required to foot the bill as an
"expense of the United Nations."1"6 On the other hand, if the court is
a separate organ from the U.N., nations would have to agree in a sepa-
rate convention to support it financially.
The proposal offered by the 1953 U.N. Committee agreed unani-
mously that an international criminal court should be sponsored by the
U.N. '7 The Committee discussed ways in which an International
Criminal Court might be established under the United Nations Char-
ter: 1) through an amendment of the International Court of Justice to
create a criminal chamber in the I.C.J.; 2) through an action of the
General Assembly, under authority conferred to it in Article 14 of the
League of Nations, to draw up a statute for the court and have states
sign and ratify the court; 3) through an amendment of the U.N. Char-
ter to create a new organ for the International Criminal Court; or 4)
through an amendment of the U.N. Charter to remove any difficulties
which might impede the General Assembly from creating a court.0 8
After analyzing these issues, the Committee favored, instead, creating
an independent organ from the United Nations, which would be less
likely to become politicized than a U.N. organ.
0 9
The MacPherson proposal in 1992, in contrast, argued that the
104. Id. at 333.
105. Id. at 322 (art. 56).
106. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) I.C.J. REP. 151,
156, 162 (1962).
107. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 215.




international criminal court should be established as a subsidiary
organ of the General Assembly or the Security Council under Articles
22 or 29.10 The proposal favored the Security Council over the Gen-
eral Assembly because it is vested with broader authority to maintain
international peace and security through whatever means are neces-
sary, including the ability to create an international criminal court. 1 '
The General Assembly, in contrast, does not have this authority, but,
to MacPherson, is still preferable to a non-U.N. entity.
MacPherson's proposal was considered, but no action was taken in
1993, when the ILC further reviewed the matter in its 1993 Draft
Statute. The ILC failed to resolve this issue."'
2. The Selection of Judges
The next step is to determine how judges will be elected and how
court proceedings will be administered.
The 1953 Committee proposed that 15 judges be elected. The
Committee suggested that the Secretary-General should select candi-
dates from a list of nation-nominated judges and submit these to all
member states for a vote, with the caveat that no two judges be from
the same nation. The judges would be elected for 9 year terms on a
rotating basis, so that every 5 years, 3 judges would retire."'
MacPherson's proposal only differs from the 1953 approach in one
respect; he proposed a two-tiered panel of senior and associate judges.
Senior judges would administer the court, hear the proceedings and
issue rules of procedures. Associate judges would preside over trials
and preliminary hearings."4 For each trial, three judges would be as-
signed by lot, and a majority rule would decide the case."' Mr.
MacPherson suggested 9-15 Senior judges and an unspecified number
of associate judges.
The 1993 ILC Draft Statute proposed an even larger number of
judges than the other two proposals, 18 judges, and a longer term, 12
years, to compensate for their inability to be reelected." 6 Following
the earlier two proposals, the judges would be elected from a list of
nominees, one submitted from each state party to the tribunal, such
that no two judges could be from any one state."7 The major short-
coming of the ILC proposal was the Committee's decision to make the
110. MACPHERSON, supra note 68, at 22-26.
111. Id.
112. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 33, 258 (art. 2).
113. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 17.
114. MACPHERSON, supra note 68, at 248-49.
115. Id.
116. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 260 (art. 5), 261 (art. 7).
117. Id. (art. 7).
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"permanent" international criminal court one in which judges could sit
only when called to hear a case."' Therefore, these judges would not
receive a salary, but rather, a daily allowance during the period in
which they performed their functions.' 9 This aspect of the proposal
contradicts the nature of a "permanent" court.
3. The Adversarial or Inquisitorial Model
The adversarial model of trial management provides separate
defense counsel for the accused, in order to provide fair legal repre-
sentation. The inquisitorial model uses only one impartial jurisconsult
to present the case for both the prosecution and defense, and is often
recognized as being more cost-efficient. One controversy over this issue
rests on the requirement by some nations' constitutions, such as the
United States', that the defendants have a right to personal counsel.
Use of the inquisitorial approach could prevent these nations, particu-
larly the U.S., from participating in the court, and thus, would under-
mine the court's existence.
For this reason, the 1953 ILC proposal, MacPherson's proposal,
and the ILC draft, all advocate the use of the common law adversarial
model for the court. The 1953 and the MacPherson proposals both
stipulate that the defendant's counsel would be paid for by the court,
at the defendant's choice. 2 The ILC Draft, however, placed an addi-
tional condition: if the court is to pay for the attorney, the court must
select the attorney.'
2'
G. Procedural Laws to Apply
Although M. Cherif Bassiouni states that the applicable procedur-
al law is not of primary importance because "international human
rights norms and standards on fairness have reached such a level that
developing a common denominator of a sufficiently high standard to
satisfy the requirements of most countries of the world is quite possi-
ble,"122 some countries clearly provide more. For example, the inter-
national human rights norms and standards on fairness do not guar-
antee as many protections as U.S. citizens are guaranteed in their
Constitution. 1" This problem leaves three options for procedural laws
in the international criminal court: 1) to establish a code of interna-
tional criminal procedure; 2) to use the procedures of one chosen na-
tion; or 3) to transfer the procedural laws of the state bringing the ac-
tion to the international criminal court.
118. Id. at 263-64.
119. Id. at 268 (art. 17).
120. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 248-49; MACPHERSON, supra note 68, at 57.
121. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 287 (Art. 30).




All of the proposals thus far have opted in favor of creating a code
of criminal procedures for the court. The 1952 U.N. Draft Statute in-
cludes a chapter on Procedure pertaining to standards for indictment,
right to a fair trial, and innocence until proof of guilt, but does not
provide for the right to a jury trial.124
The ILC Draft Statute builds upon the 1952 chapter to include
the largest number of rights to the accused as possible. It provides
Miranda rights, the right to court-appointed counsel, and freedom from
self-incrimination."2 In addition, the Draft requires the Prosecution
to initiate an investigation as to whether a sufficient basis exists for it
to proceed with a case before issuing an indictment.'26 The indict-
ment is then to be screened by the Bureau of the Court to ascertain
whether a prima facie case exists before it issues a warrant. 27 The
accused shall, therefore, receive a fair, expeditious, and public trial,
having been informed of all of his/her individual rights in his/her own
language." In addition, a presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused will exist."2 Finally, the accused will not ordinarily be sub-
ject to double jeopardy under this statute, unless there was a lack of
impartiality under a previous tribunal.3 Not only does the ILC
Draft afford protection to the accused, but also to victims and witness-
es, which may be imperative for trying the alleged rape victims from
the Bosnian war crimes. 3 ' The ILC Draft, section on Procedure,
should be viewed as a model for the international criminal court.
In sum, the arguments in favor of an international criminal court
clearly outweigh those against its establishment. An international
criminal court is necessary to prevent the ongoing violations of inter-
national humanitarian law that are not addressed through the cre-
ation of ad hoc courts. Careful drafting of an international criminal
court statute can address the concerns that nations present over sover-
eignty, jurisdiction, and enforcement, and still effectively adjudicate
international crime.
V. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Drawing from the lessons learned from the proposals discussed in
the previous sections, a competent and permanent international crimi-
nal court must still be created. This section creates such a proposal,
124. BASSIOUNI, supra note 64, at 253.
125. ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 287 (art. 30).
126. Id. at 287-89.
127. Id. at 290 (art. 32).
128. Id. at 301,304 (arts. 40, 44).
129. Id. at 304 (art. 43).
130. Id. at 307 (art. 45).
131. Id. at 309 (art. 46).
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and is followed by a sample Draft Statute.
Although the ad hoc Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal is a positive
step in the codification of international criminal law, its failure to
deter ongoing. abuses of human rights in Bosnia alone, demonstrates
the need for a permanent international criminal court. Many of the fol-
lowing proposals find their roots in the 1993 International Law Com-
mission Draft Statute, which should be rewarded for its thoroughness
and rigid stance on enforcement. Several key areas, most importantly
its lack of "permanency," however, are modified.
A. Composition of the Proposed International Criminal Court
1. Framework of the Court
The international criminal court must be a permanent standing
adjudicatory body available to: 1) nations which bring cases to its at-
tention and 2) individuals filing complaints against their own nation,
such as an ethnic minority or a political group. The court should have
a preliminary body,'a Committing Chamber, to investigate the charges
prior to any official charging, similar to the body currently in use in
the ad hoc military tribunal.
The court could be located in any one of several international
cities, but it should be a separate and independent organ of the United
Nations. This separation would serve several purposes: 1) the court
would be less likely to become embroiled in U.N. politics if it were
separate from the General Assembly or the Security Council; 2) the
court would be less likely to receive the stigma of the International
Court of Justice if it is a separate legal institution; 3) the codification
of international crimes and criminal procedures could be administered
or voted on through the General Assembly and the Security Council;
and (4) all member states of the U.N. could then be required to con-
tribute financially to the court pursuant to Article 17, paragraph 2 as
"expenses of the organization."" 2 Because criminal "stigma" in itself
has value, the international community would benefit greatly from a
large number of cases being brought early on in its tenure. This stigma
may deter many countries from committing further violations of inter-
national humanitarian law. In addition, the court would benefit from
addressing any administrative problems not foreseen in its creation,
and could demonstrate to the world that it would take a rigid, but fair
and impartial, stance on international crime.
In order to make this court a separate organ of the United Na-
tions, the U.N. Charter could adopt Article 14 of the former League of
Nations, allowing the General Assembly to create a court by statute




upon a two-thirds majority vote. If the General Assembly does not
reach consensus at first, the Secretary General could ask for comments
from the member nations, and request the drafters of the court, likely
the International Law Commission or the Working Group of the Unit-
ed Nations, to incorporate them. If political controversy inhibits the
General Assembly from creating an effective court, the Secretary Gen-
eral should draft a statute and allow the Security Council to vote for
the court.13 Contrary to the bilingual status of the U.N., the interna-
tional criminal court should recognize the increased importance of the
Spanish-speaking world in making English, Spanish, and French all
official languages of the court. Irrespective of the official languages of
the court, any individual tried before the court should still have the
right to all proceedings conducted in his/her own native language.
2. Selection and Responsibilities of Judges
The Court should have fifteen to eighteen independent judges
from different nations, drawn from as many geo-political regions of the
world as possible. This approach adopts the International Law Com-
mission proposal that terms be long, such as twelve years, and that
judges not be reelected. A long tenancy may assist judges in gaining
the knowledge necessary to hear cases effectively. These judges should
be elected on a four-year rotational basis, to maintain the highest level
of judicial impartiality.
This approach rejects, however, the International Law
Commission's proposal that the judges be present only when a case is
brought to the court. In contrast, the judges should sit permanently,
and be paid salaries as such. When the court is not is session, the
judges could discuss, research, and write on the expansion of interna-
tional criminal law. They should use their expertise in the field to
advance public opinion and scholarly research on the principles of
international criminal law. This will assure the international commu-
nity that, in fact, the court is "permanent."
The election of the judges should be administered through the
United Nations, which already has established voting and participato-
ry procedures, and representatives from all of its member states. The
Secretary General could screen nominations and then compile a list of
candidates to submit to the General Assembly. The candidates with
the highest number of votes from the General Assembly would be
elected to the court, so long as no two of them are from the same coun-
try.
If a judge became incapacitated or withdraws at any time while
133. The five permanent members of the Security Council must unanimously
agree, and a two-thirds majority of the remaining non-permanent members must
agree.
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seated on the court, another judge from his country could be nominat-
ed and approved by a majority vote of the remaining judges on the
court. If the nominated judge did not meet this threshold number of
votes, then any nation could nominate a judge immediately for approv-
al by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In addition, any
judge suspected of impropriety or partiality while exercising official
duties would be removed from the court by a two-thirds majority of the
other judges. No judge would be allowed to serve in any governmental
or judicial position in his/her country while seated on the Court, be-
cause this might affect the impartial nature of the judge's position. A
judge could, however, at any time, abstain from participation in a
particular case before the court with no consequences.
Three judges should be selected, on an annual rotating basis to
serve in a Committing Chamber. This Chamber would be responsible
for examining the evidence presented by the complainants to deter-
mine if this evidence is sufficient to go to trial, or if further evidence is
necessary and available.
Once personal jurisdiction over an accused was obtained, a panel
of five new judges (none of which served in the Committing Chamber)
would hear the case. Four of the five judges would have to agree in
order to convict a defendant. Should a judge abstain from voting dur-
ing a particular case, three of the four remaining judges must agree in
order to convict a defendant. Finally, an appeals panel of three judges,
who have served neither in the Committing Chamber, nor on the first
panel, should be available to examine the final judgment if allegations
of legal or procedural violation are alleged.
B. Procedural Guarantees
As suggested in the proposals set forth above, the adversarial
model of the British-United States systems should be adopted for the
court. This model would call for court appointed defense attorneys for
indigent defendants, and a separate prosecutorial branch administered
by the court, similar to the U.S. Attorney's office. This latter proposal
would allow attorneys competent both in international criminal law
and the court's procedures to bring the case. If nations rejected this op-
tion in the General Assembly, due to beliefs that the adversarial pro-
cess was neither just, nor speedy enough, in favor of the inquisitorial
approach, then an accused with the right to personal defense counsel
in his/her own country should be allowed to retain this right in the
international criminal court.
The high level of procedural guarantees laid out by the Interna-
tional Law Commission in its draft statute should be used as an ex-
ample." Miranda rights, freedom from self-incrimination, explana-
134. See ILC Draft, supra note 1, at 287-309.
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tion of all individual rights in the language of the defendant, a pre-
sumption of innocence for the accused, protections for witness testimo-
ny, a speedy trial, a right to rebut all charges levied, and freedom from
double jeopardy should all be incorporated into the code of procedural
guarantees. In addition, the defendant should have a right to have all
court proceedings translated into his/her native language, so that the
defendant understands the judicial process, all testimony, and court
decisions. There should not be, however, a jury trial in these proceed-
ings, because the selection process would be far too complicated. The
code of procedural guarantees should be drafted either by the first set
of judges elected to the court, the International Law Commission, or
the Working Group of the United Nations, subject to a two-thirds ap-
proval vote in the General Assembly.
C. Jurisdiction
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Builders of the international criminal court should lay a solid
foundation that is fully competent over a small number of highly legiti-
mized crimes. The court must demonstrate its capacity to adjudicate
these crimes effectively before increasing the number of codified crimes
to its jurisdiction. M. Cherif Bassiouni states it well:
"An international criminal court is not to be considered as an all or
nothing proposition. It can be developed incrementally as well,
provided that it is given enough standing and competence to devel-
op a record that will permit it to gain more and more confidence
and therefore expand its beneficial role ... Its success should be
enough to reassure anyone who has had the doubts that were
raised in 1950 when the (first) court was established and that are
raised now in anticipation of an international criminal court.""
Following this approach, the international criminal court should ini-
tially have exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes already codified in
international conventions, including, War Crimes, Genocide, Slavery,
Diplomatic Immunity, Hostage-Taking and Piracy. The exclusive juris-
diction of the international criminal court is chosen to avoid the "Ar-
gentinean problem" mentioned earlier, and to monitor closely the pro-
cedural rights afforded to the accused. A "bottom-line", tough enforce-
ment policy with respect to these crimes could help the court to build
its international legitimacy, reputation, and functioning procedures.
After the court has demonstrated its legitimacy, it could begin the
process of codifying new international crimes, eventually to include
more controversial crimes such as drug-trafficking and terrorism. It is
important to add these crimes later, showing respect for the high level
135. Bassiouni & Blakesly, supra note 75, at 171.
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of state sovereignty still omnipresent in the international arena. Con-
troversial crimes at the onset may weaken both the membership and
effectiveness of the court. Codification of these crimes should be
achieved, again, through a two-thirds majority of the General Assem-
bly. However, in contrast with the exclusive jurisdiction crimes enu-
merated above, nations could opt-out of particular crimes.
Any newly codified crimes should be subject to concurrent jurisdic-
tion between the international criminal court and a domestic court. No
accused individual should be subject to "double jeopardy" in the inter-
national criminal court: a case adjudicated in the international court
would serve as res judicata in the national courts. Similarly, if a na-
tional court has exercised its concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the
international court could not rule on the issue, but it could review the
procedures for their partiality and potential error. The court's only re-
course, in the event of error, would be to remand the case for further
domestic proceedings. This aspect of the court would help to assure na-
tions that they did maintain sovereign rights over crimes affecting
their territory, as long as they provide fair and impartial judicial pro-
ceedings.
2. Personal Jurisdiction
The international criminal court should have personal jurisdiction
over all national individuals, whether they are public or private indi-
viduals of a state. Allowing public officials both to bring cases and be
tried would help to establish a heightened legitimacy to some govern-
ments, and would provide a check on their actions. Universal Interest
Jurisdiction should continue to apply in the international community
as it does now. In addition, however, the court should implement a
system similar to that functioning in the Bosnian ad hoc Tribunal now.
The Committing Chamber, upon deciding that enough basis exists to
bring a case, should use Interpol to issue a warrant to a defendant
wherever this defendant can be located. The court should also estab-
lish sanctions or the suspension of U.N. privileges for nations which
refuse to extradite criminals within their borders to the court's juris-
diction. The combination of these resources should greatly increase the
likelihood of lawful extraditions in the international community.
D. Enforcement Mechanisms
Individuals convicted of the crimes within the court's exclusive
jurisdiction should be subject to fines, international community service,
and incarceration. The convicted criminal should serve out a pre-trial
prison sentence in a prison devoted to the international criminal court.
Similar to the Dutch prisons allocated to the Bosnian ad hoc Military
Tribunal, this method should preserve and afford the greatest number
of individual liberties for the accused. Once a sentence has been
handed down, the sentence should be served out in a neutral prison
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(not from the state of either party to the matter) designated for the
court's use. If the treatment of this prisoner falls below established
principles of international treatment, then this prisoner should be
relocated to another prison. There should be no death penalty sentenc-
es handed down by the court. U.N.-sponsored executions may seem
hypocritical to the purpose and scope of the court. Finally, this propos-
al does not advance the need for an international "Devil's Island" at
present. A fairly small number of cases will probably be brought in the
first few years, making this an unnecessary expenditure. Perhaps in
the long run this idea should be reassessed.
The penalties for the concurrent jurisdiction crimes, to be deter-
mined in the future, should be slightly more lenient than those stipu-
lated for exclusive jurisdiction. Life imprisonment should not be sanc-
tioned until such time as the Member States and General Assembly
elect otherwise, and the penalties should range from fines, reimburse-
ment to the international community for profits gained from the crime
(such as in the case of environmental, commercial, or expropriation
crimes), international community service, and short incarceration
terms.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the past 500 years, scholars have devoted'a large amount of
time and effort to the creation of an international criminal court. Al-
though the proposals themselves have contained excellent ideas, states
have not been willing to cede sovereignty to an international body on
criminal law, an issue believed to be of a domestic nature. The past ad
hoc proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo did not deter the occurrence
of international crime, nor have the current Bosnian proceedings put
an end to human rights violations in Bosnia. One lesson must be re-
membered: a refusal to adjudicate violations of international humani-
tarian law encourages belligerents to threaten the peace and stability
of the world. If one positive step for humanity can be achieved from
the current atrocities in Bosnia, it should be the establishment of a
permanent international criminal court. The time for a permanent in-
ternational criminal court is now.
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DRAFT STATUTE
OF THE





The purpose of this statute is to establish an International Criminal
Court to try natural persons of crimes that are generally recognized




The Court shall apply international criminal law for which the states
have conferred jurisdiction to the court, or have assented to the law by
agreement, convention, or otherwise.
ARTICLE 3
PERMANENT NATURE OF THE COURT
The court shall consist of a permanent body and locale. If there are no
cases pending on the court's docket, its judges will dedicate their time
to scholarly research in international criminal law, and any other
endeavors necessary to further the development of international crimi-
nal law and the functioning of the court.
ARTICLE 4
LOCATION OF THE COURT
The court shall be established as a separate and independent organ of
the United Nations.
(1) As an organ of the United Nations, member states will be obligat-
ed financially to the court.
(2) The International Criminal Court will not be linked in any way to
the International Court of Justice.
(3) United Nations voting procedures through the General Assembly
and the Security Council may be used to codify additional interna-
tional crimes, to alter any established mechanism of the court,




LANGUAGES OF THE COURT
The official languages of the court shall be English, French, and Span-
ish.
CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT
ARTICLE 6
QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES
(1) The Court shall be composed of independent judges who are recog-
nized as experts in international criminal law or human rights,
who possess qualifications to serve on the highest judicial bodies
of their own respective countries.
(2) Judges may be of any nationality, but no two judges from any one
country shall serve on the court at the same time.
(3) The judges must represent as many regions and geo-political sys-
tems of the world as possible.
ARTICLE 7
NOMINATION OF JUDGES
(1) There shall be from 15-18 judges seated on court.
(2) These judges shall be elected for 12 years, and their terms shall
rotate such that every 4 years, 5-6 judges will retire. After the end
of the term, these judges may not be reelected to the court.
(3) Judges shall be nominated by their own respective nations which
have respected the jurisdiction of the court. From these nomina-
tions, the Secretary-General will review these and comprise a list
of potential candidates to the General Assembly for a vote. A two-
thirds majority must be met, after which the candidates will be
chosen by the highest number of votes, with no two judges from
the same nation.
(4) If a judge should resign or become capacitated while seated on the
court, another judge from his nation may be nominated and must
be approved by a majority vote of the remaining judges on the
court. If the nominated judge is not approved, other states may
nominate judges for immediate acceptance by a majority vote of
the General Assembly, and the Security Council.
(5) A judge may be removed by the other members of the court by a
majority vote only for reasons which might interfere with that
judges impartial capacity on the court.
(6) While serving on the court, no judge shall perform any govern-
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mental or judicial function in that judge's respective state.




(1) Each year, three judges shall be appointed to examine all evidence
offered by the Complainants.
(2) If the evidence satisfies the Committing Chamber, the Chamber
shall certify it to the court. If the Chamber is not satisfied with
the evidence presented, it may request further support or dismiss
the case until further satisfactory evidence is admitted.
(3) These judges will not be permitted to take part in the decisions of
the court on a particular case in which they served in the Com-
mitting Chamber.
ARTICLE 9
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND DEFENSE ATTORNEY
OPTION 1
THERE SHALL BE SEPARATE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
(1) The Complainant shall appoint a prosecution attorney who will be re-
sponsible for filing an indictment and conduction prosecution before
the court.
(2) If the Defendant cannot afford private defense counsel, the court
shall appoint one.
OPTION 2
THERE SHALL BE ONE JURISCONSULT
The court will appoint a jurisconsult, elected by the judges of the court to
examine the prosecution and defense, and present the case to the court.
However, if the Defendant would have separate defense counsel in his/her
own nation because of a Constitutional provision, then his/her own nation
may appoint counsel, or the court can 'transfer the proceedings' of the
court to the national court.
CHAPTER III
COMPETENCE OF THE COURT
ARTICLE 10
JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
(1) The Court shall be competent to judge natural persons, whether
private individuals or public individuals.
(2) Universal Interest Jurisdiction shall apply for any crimes with a uni-
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versal interest, such that they threaten to undermine the founda-
tions of the international community as a whole. These crimes need
not be committed within the boundaries of the Complainant State,
nor does the Defendant need to be found on the territory of the Com-
plainant State.
(3) In the event that a nation does not comply with an extradition re-
quest by the court, two penalties shall apply:
(a) that nation's United Nations privileges and voting rights shall
be suspended; and
(b) the Committing Chamber may issue a warrant to Interpol to
seek out the Defendant, and bring the Defendant to trial.
ARTICLE 11
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Subject to further codification through convention as the member states of
the United Nations agree:
(1) The court shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over War Crimes, Slav-
ery, Genocide, Diplomatic Immunity, Piracy, Hostage-Taking, and
any other crime which is codified into convention at such time as the
court enters into effect.
(2) The court shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with national courts
over all other international crimes which are later codified into law.
(a) A nation may decide if it will hear a case within its domestic
courts, or submit it to the international court.
(b) No offender shall be subject to double jeopardy: If a case is sub-
mitted to the international court, it shall not be retried in a
domestic court, and vice versa.
(c) If a nation with jurisdiction fails to adjudicate a case adequately
according to international standards, another nation may sub-
mit this case to the international court for review. If the court
finds the allegations valid, it may remand the case to the na-
tional court for further proceedings.
(3) No provision stated herein shall prevent the nations of the world
from conferring jurisdiction to the international court for a more ex-
pansive list of international crimes. International conventions and
treaties may be codified by a two-thirds majority vote within the
General Assembly.
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RULES OF THE COURT
(1) The court shall adopt rules and procedures which must, at a mini-
mum, incorporate international general principles of law, norms, and
standards of fair trial practice. The General Assembly shall decide if
the rules and procedures established by the court are adequate with
a two-thirds majority vote.
(a) Issues such as minimum age of the Accused, the necessary men-
tal state for the commission of a crime, duress, and insanity
should be incorporated in these rules.
(b) Privacy rights for individual witness testimony must be provid-
ed.
(1) In the case of rape, the victim shall have the right to pri-
vacy, including the right to testify in a separate room from
the accusers in certain circumstances.
(2) If the standards set forth in these rules does not reach the level of a
nation's domestic standards, and may prejudice the case then the
court may elect to "transfer the proceedings" from the national court
to the international court, and apply the national court's procedures,
or it may elect not to hear the case.
ARTICLE 13
RIGHTS OF THE DEFENDANT
(1) There shall be innocence until proof of guilt. An Accused shall not be
required to prove his/her innocence.
(2) The Defendant shall have the right to freedom from self-incrimina-
tion.
(3) The Defendant shall not be subject to lower standards of fair trial
than he/she would receive in his/her own nation. If defense counsel is
provided in his/her own nation, then it shall be provided by the
court.
(4) The Defendant has a right to all court proceedings translated into
his/her native language.
(5) If the Defendant is incarcerated during the pre-trial period, it shall
be in a prison set aside for use by the international court.
(6) The Defendant has the right to present and rebut all evidence.
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(7) The Defendant has the right to a just and speedy trial, as is possible
in light of the court's docket.
ARTICLE 14
TRIAL
(1) Five judges shall hear each case, and a majority vote is necessary for
conviction. If one judge should abstain from judgment, and the other
four judges are split, the remaining judges shall designate an impar-
tial judge to cast the deciding vote.
(2) If judicial error is committed during any part of the trial, the Ac-
cused shall have the right to a new trial.
(3) The Defendant shall have the right to one appeal to a panel of three
judges from the court.
ARTICLE 15
SENTENCING
(1) For all "exclusive jurisdiction" crimes of the court, the court may im-
pose a fine, life imprisonment or imprisonment for years in a prison
dedicated for the use of the international court. This prison shall not
be in the nation of the Complainant or the Defendant. In addition,
the court may order the Defendant to surrender any profits gained in
the commission of the crime charged.
(2) For all "concurrent jurisdiction" crimes of the court, the court may
impose a fine, imprisonment as stipulated above, international com-
munity service, or a surrender of profits from the crime.
(3) The death penalty shall not be imposed by the international court.
(4) Flogging, caning, or any other form of inhumane punishment shall
not be imposed by the court.
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